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A. Introduction 
Given recent developments in relation to the prosecution of 
international crimes,1 it might be thought that one of the last bastions of 
sovereignty has been breached, and international criminal law has not only 
entrenched itself in international law. Indeed further to this, it has assumed a 
supranational position that stands entirely above States, promising justice 
for all and as a trump card over depredations committed in the name of State 
sovereignty. After all, Charles Taylor from Liberia is standing trial before 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Slobodan Milošević only escaped 
judgment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) by dying before the end of his trial, Saddam Hussein was prosecuted 
and sentenced to death before the Iraqi High Tribunal, and Omar al-Bashir 
has recently been the subject of a request for an arrest warrant from the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Surely international criminal 
law reaches its iconographic apogee with the prosecution of such leaders,2 
brought down to size by the majesty of the law (if not the grandeur of the 
often aseptic courtrooms)? 
Of course, in fact, the picture is far more complicated. Although it is 
too early to come to any judgment on the Taylor case, his appearance before 
the Special Court was as much a function of States tiring of him continuing 
to meddle in Liberian politics than a commitment to seeing him stand trial. 
Milošević was for many years apparently kept beyond the reach of the 
ICTY for reasons of ensuring peace in former Yugoslavia, then domestic 
political reasons, and his trial was itself one from which we might admit,3 
lessons can be learned.4 The trial and punishment of Saddam Hussein is 
largely seen as having been mishandled, and inconsistent with the relevant 
 
1  As Ruti Teitel has said: “There have never been more leaders in the dock, or, under 
the shadow of its threat”, Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary 
Transitional Justice, Cornell International Law Journal 38 (2005), 837-862, 837. 
2  See Maya Steinitz, The Milošević Trial-Live: An Iconical Analysis of International 
Law’s Claim to Legitimate Authority, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 
(2005), 103-123, 103; Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, Max 
Planck Yearbook of International Law 6 (2002), 1-35, 1. 
3  The same could well be said of Franjo Tuđman, who managed to avoid indictment for 
various reasons, until his death, see: Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda 
and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation (2008), 118. 
4  See in general: Gideon Boas, The Milošević Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of 
Complex International Criminal Proceedings (2007). 
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human rights norms,5 and possible proceedings against al-Bashir have led to 
considerable controversy, with the African Union requesting deferral of the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) processes relating to him, and the 
Security Council finding itself somewhat torn on the matter.6 As such we 
must be careful not to present what Georg Schwarzenberger described as the 
chocolate box version of international law and society.7 Some of the 
difficulties are referable to the nature of the international legal order, some 
of which are referable, on the other hand, to insalubrious forms of politics. It 
remains the case that the international legal order is torn between two 
imperatives, what Hedley Bull would have described as the pluralist and the 
solidarist views,8 and the difference between an international society and an 
international community.9 Nonetheless, some are simply problems of 
political will, and others are overstated, and the simple fact that it is possible 
to speak of the problems attending bringing leaders to justice rather than 
dismissing its possibility is in itself a development from the position soon 
enough ago that most international criminal lawyers can still remember it. 
This piece will seek to explain some of those problems involved in 
prosecuting leaders (including those of States)10 and those who, if we agree 
that we will see it as the general thrust of international criminal law, bear the 
 
5  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special 
Tribunal, Cornell International Law Journal 38 (2005), 327-390. 364; Michael Scharf, 
The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), 258-263, 259; Miranda Sissons & Ari S. 
Bassin, Was the Dujail Trial Fair?, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), 
272-286, 272; Nehal Bhuta, Fatal Errors, The Trial and Appeal Judgments in the 
Dujail Case, Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008), 39-65, 39. 
6  See the African Union Communiqué of the 142nd Peace and Security Council, 21 July 
2008 and SC Res. 1828 (31 July 2008) UN Doc S/PV 5947, alongside the statements 
attending its adoption. See infra.  
7  Georg Schwarzenberger, The Misery and Grandeur of International Law, Current 
Legal Problems 17 (1964), 184-210, 185-186. 
8  For modern expositions see Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? 
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (2005), 46-62 and 
Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society (2000), Chapter 1. 
9  See Jason Ralph, Defending the Society of States: Why the US Opposes the 
International Criminal Court (2007), 13-20. 
10  By which this piece means those who are heads of State, heads of government, or 
other top-ranking officials (including those at such levels in rebel or cognate 
movements). 
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greatest responsibility for international crimes,11 those at the apex of the 
command structure, in particular, heads of government. In doing so, though, 
it will do so with an eye to remembering that while international criminal 
law cannot live up to all its promises, it still keeps at least as many as most 
leaders do, and they are not the only international criminals deserving of 
punishment.  
B. International Criminal Law: Is There an Imperative 
to “Aim High”? 
International Criminal law, at least in the 20th century, has often 
looked to prosecute leaders. For example, the 1919 Inter-Allied Commission 
was empowered to investigate the responsibility of the “authors of the 
war”.12 Indeed, the commission suggested that high officials, including the 
Kaiser, be tried for war crimes, inter alia on the basis of command 
responsibility.13 The two major mid-century international criminal tribunals, 
which form the basis of modern international criminal law, the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo International Military Tribunals (IMT), were both created for the 
prosecution of high-ranking offenders.  
The Nuremberg IMT was created to implement the Moscow 
declaration, which promised “the major criminals whose offences have no 
particular geographical location and […] will be punished by a joint 
declaration of the governments of the Allies”.14 Similarly, Article 1 of the 
Nuremberg IMT Charter stated that “there shall be established an 
International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) for the 
just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis.”15 Although the Tokyo IMT was created pursuant to the 
Moscow declaration, which, in the relevant parts, merely promised “stern 
 
11  The ICTY has consistently held that abuse of authority is an aggravating factor, see 
e.g Prosecutor v. Blaškić , Judgment, IT-96-14-A, 29 July 2004, para.727; Prosecutor 
v. Babić, Judgment, IT-03-72-A, 18 July 2005, para.81. 
12  The Report of the Commission is reprinted in (1920) 14 American Journal of 
International Law 95-145. 
13  Id., 116-117 and 121. 
14  Declaration of Moscow, 1 November 1943, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
wwii/moscow.asp (last visited 8 December 2008). 
15  1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis Power and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 1, 82 
U.N.T.S 279. 
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justice shall be meted out to war criminals”,16 Article 1 of the Tokyo IMT’s 
Statute reads “[t]he International Military Tribunal for the Far East is hereby 
established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals in the Far East.”17 
More recently, although there is no gravity threshold for the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR, they have been required by Security 
Council Resolution 1534 to focus on “the most senior leaders suspected of 
being most responsible for crimes” in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.18 This is, 
however more to do with the fact that the Council wishes them to finish up 
their business quickly than a principled view of the appropriate role of 
international prosecutions.19 
Similar financial and logistical concerns led the Secretary-General, at 
the insistence of the Security Council, to provide, in the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone Article 15(1)20 that “[t]he Prosecutor shall be 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law […].”21 In the AFRC Appeal,22 one defendant, Kanu asserted that this 
was a jurisdictional requirement, and that the Trial Chamber failed to 
 
16  Potsdam Declaration, reprinted in Neil Boister & Robert Cryer (eds), Documents on 
the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (2008) 
1, 1-2. 
17  Tokyo IMT Charter, reprinted in id., 7, 7.  
18  Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 3 (2005) 82-102, 87; Darryl A. Mundis, The Judicial 
Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 
American Journal of International Law 99 (2005) 142-158, 142; Larry D. Johnson, 
Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human 
Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, American Journal of International Law 99 
(2005) 158-174, 158. 
19  Equally, the judges had, early in the life of the ICTY, expressed disquiet about the 
low-level perpetrators being indicted. See Antonio Cassese, Judge of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, in: Timothy L.H. McCormack and Cheryl 
Saunders (eds), Sir Ninian Stephen: A Tribute (2007) 192. 
20  Available at Official web-site of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: http://www.sc-
sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html (last visited 8 December 2008). 
21  There is a similar requirement in the Cambodian mixed chambers, see Law on the 
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 
1, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_ 
27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (last visited 8 December 2008): 
22  Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgment, SCSL-04-16-A, 3 March 2008 
(AFRC Appeal). 
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establish that he did bear the greatest responsibility before convicting him.23 
The Appeals Chamber was firm with any such suggestion, stating that 
 
The only workable interpretation of Article 1(1) is that it guides 
the Prosecutor in his exercise of prosecutorial discretion. That 
discretion must be exercised in good faith, on the basis of sound 
professional judgment…it would also be unreasonable and 
unworkable to suggest that is to be exercised by the Trial 
Chamber or Appeals Chamber when the at the end of the trial 
[…] it would be inconceivable that after a long and expensive 
trial the Trial Chamber could conclude that although the 
commission of serious crimes has been established beyond 
reasonable doubt against the accused the indictment ought to be 
struck out on the ground that it has not been proved that the 
accused was not one of those who bore the greatest 
responsibility […] Kanu’s interpretation of Article 1 is a 
desperate attempt to avoid responsibility for crimes for which he 
had been found guilty […][and is][…] therefore without any 
merit.24 
 
Hence, the requirement that the Prosecutor focus on those who are 
leaders (and thus bear the greatest responsibility) is a guide, not a 
jurisdictional requirement, as international criminal law cannot provide for 
acquittals on the basis of relative culpability in the manner which has been 
suggested. This seems a sensible middle path to draw. As will be returned to 
later, leaders are not the only people who deserve punishment. 
A similar path has been taken in relation to the ICC. The Prosecutor of 
the ICC has himself said that his focus is not on the “small fry”, but on those 
that bear greatest responsibility for international crimes, and that he will not 
be concerning himself with lower-level offenders unless perhaps they have 
committed particularly egregious crimes.25 This is consistent with the fact 
 
23  Id., paras 272-4 The Trial Chamber’s discussion is Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and 
Kanu, Judgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007 paras 640-659. 
24  AFRC Appeal, paras 282-285. 
25  Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf 7 (last 
visited 8 December 2008). 
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that the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court26 
which states that the Court is for the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community of States as a whole, and Article 17(1)(d) of the 
Statute provides for the inadmissibility of the case when it is not sufficiently 
grave to justify the use of the Court.27 This was thought by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC to opine that the gravity test needed to be applied 
against the background of the fact that it applies within the, already serious, 
class of international crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction, and 
therefore a relevant criterion for the gravity determination was whether or 
not the defendant bore the greatest responsibility, and was therefore (in 
practice) was in a senior leadership role.28 This was, in part, on the basis of 
the assumed deterrent value of focusing on such leaders: 
 
In the Chamber's opinion, only by concentrating on this type of 
individual can the deterrent effects of the activities of the Court 
be maximised because other senior leaders in similar 
circumstances will know that solely by doing what they can to 
prevent the systematic or large-scale commission of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court can they be sure that they 
will not be prosecuted by the Court.29  
 
As such, the Trial Chamber sought to make the Prosecutor’s (non-
binding) policy of going for leaders a binding requirement upon him.30  
 
26  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (Rome 
Statute, Statute). 
27  See generally John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in: 
Antonio Cassese, Paula Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 667. For discussion (and 
critique) of the early practice of the ICC on point, see Kevin Jon Heller, Situational 
Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in: Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds), 
Future Directions in International Criminal Justice (2009) (forthcoming). 
28  Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on The Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants Of Arrest, Article 58, ICC-01/04-196, 10 February 2006, 
paras 52-55.  
29  Id., para.55. 
30  Id., para.63. It was on the basis that Bosco Ntaganda was not senior enough that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to refuse an arrest warrant, on the basis that the gravity threshold 
was not reached, id., para.89. Some support for such a position can be found in: David 
M. Crane, White Man’s Justice: Applying International Criminal Justice After 
Regional Third World Conflicts, Cardozo Law Review 27 (2005-2006), 1683-1688, 
1683- 1684. 
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This result, and the type of reasoning leading to it, found stern 
response from the Appeals Chamber. To begin, they determined that it was 
not for the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine admissibility unless there are 
specific reasons for doing so.31 The additional grounds of gravity created by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, were the subject of very severe criticism 
from the Appeal Chamber, probably their greatest ire was directed at the 
requirement of seniority the Pre-Trial Chamber introduced. Not least they 
questioned the idea that deterrence ideas led to the requirement that the 
gravity threshold excluded all others than the most senior leaders: 
 
It may indeed have a deterrent effect if high-ranking leaders 
who are suspected of being responsible for having committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are brought before the 
International Criminal Court. But that the deterrent effect is 
highest if all other categories of perpetrators cannot be brought 
before the Court is difficult to understand. It seems more logical 
to assume that the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no 
category of perpetrators is per se excluded from potentially 
being brought before the Court […] The imposition of rigid 
standards primarily based on top seniority may result in neither 
retribution nor prevention being achieved […] The predictable 
exclusion of many perpetrators on the grounds proposed by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber could severely hamper the preventive, or 
deterrent, role of the Court which is a cornerstone of the creation 
of the International Criminal Court, by announcing that any 
perpetrators other than those at the very top are automatically 
excluded from the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.32 
 
As the Appeals Chamber also noted, provisions such as Article 33 of 
the Rome Statute (which provides for a limited defence of superior orders), 
and Article 27, which provides that the Statute “shall apply equally to all 
 
31  The examples of situations in which this might be appropriate were “instances where a 
case is based on the established jurisprudence of the Court, uncontested facts that 
render a case clearly inadmissible or an ostensible cause impelling the exercise of 
proprio motu review” Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled 
Decision on The Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants Of Arrest Article 58, ICC 
01/04-169-US-Exp, 13 July 2006, para.52. 
32  Id., paras 73-5. 
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persons without any distinction based on official capacity” imply that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute did not consider that only the most senior 
leaders may appear before the Court.33 As they concluded: 
 
[T]he preamble to the Rome Statute mentions “most serious 
crimes” but not “most serious perpetrators”. The preamble to the 
Statute in paragraphs five and six respectively states 
“perpetrators” and “those responsible for international crimes”. 
The reference in paragraph five of the Preamble to 
“perpetrators” is not prefixed by the delineation “most serious” 
or “most responsible”. Such language does not appear elsewhere 
in the Statute in relation to the category of perpetrators. Had the 
drafters of the Statute intended to limit its application to only the 
most senior leaders of being most responsible they could have 
done so expressly.34 
 
This seems correct, there are reasons that lower level offenders need 
punishment. The first of these is quite simple, people at the local, ground, 
level often see leaders as far away, and want to see the people who turned 
them from their homes, killed their families, and abused them, prosecuted 
rather than walking around their home towns. Any reconciliative function 
that international criminal law can have can be undermined when people are 
expected to reconcile with their neighbours and erstwhile persecutors on the 
basis of a trial of someone who sat in the capital.35 It must be remembered 
that reconciliation is an individual process at least as much as a societal 
one.36 Next is the problem, for many perpetrators, even those of a fairly high 
level, who are part of a bureaucratic system dedicated to the commission of 
international crimes, but who are, in Hannah Arendt’s memorable phrase 
about Adolf Eichmann, although evildoers, “banal” evildoers,37 who allow 
themselves to become unthinking cogs in a machine. At least part of the 
answer to this is that it is important to recapitulate that allowing that to 
 
33  Id., para 78. 
34  Id., para 79. 
35  As Catherine MacKinnon has said “to every woman who is raped, the fish who did it 
is plenty big”, Catherine MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, New 
England Journal of International and Comparative Law 14 (2008), 101-110, 106. 
36  See, in part, Arne J Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency, Understanding Collective 
Evildoing (2005), 272-281. 
37  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (1994). 
Although see Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall be Made Straight (1965). 
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occur is, in itself, considerable wrongdoing. The message ought to be 
brought home, in part through the expressive function of punishment, that 
such persons are responsible for that wrongdoing, as has been said by Alain 
Finkielkraut38 and Arne Vetlesen,39 amongst others. This point retains its 
vitality, in spite of the fact that Arendt was probably wrong in relation to 
Eichmann himself, who was not the banal, unreflective bureaucrat he was 
portrayed as by his defence team.40 
Nonetheless, debate often concentrates on why it is important to 
prosecute those most responsible, (i.e. those at the highest levels). As was 
common ground between the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chamber, those at the 
highest level are in the best place to prevent large scale crimes. In addition, 
there are important didactic aspects of trying those at the highest level, in 
particular to demonstrate that no-one is above the law, a point which is a 
fundamental tenet of the rule of law.41  
If it is a legitimate aim of international trials to tell the story of the 
conflict,42 then trials of those at the highest level are most likely to be able 
to do so whilst remaining sufficiently linked to the culpability of the 
particular defendant before the court. This is important, as it is 
inappropriate, not least as it is (usually) prejudicial to the accused to stray 
beyond the facts relevant to the charges in the indictment. To do so is also 
perilous from the point of view of ensuring an expeditious trial for the 
defendant,43 and risks imposing on a defendant the burden of dealing with 
issues that do not bear on their personal culpability, or, if not, attempting to 
write on broader aspects of the relevant conflict without the benefit of 
argument on both sides. Also on a pragmatic level, one argument for 
prosecution of those at the highest level of authority is an incapacitative one, 
in other words that such people are most likely to instigate renewed conflict, 
and as such are best removed from public life. Although this is a deeply 
 
38  Alain Finkielkraut, (Roxanne Lapidus trans.), Remembering in Vain: The Klaus 
Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Humanity (1992).  
39  supra note 36, Vetlesen, Chapter 5. 
40  Id., Chapter 2,  
41  See e.g. the allusion to this in Crane, note 30, 1683. 
42  Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (1997), Introduction, 13; 
although see José Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, Michigan 
Law Review 96 (1998) 2031-2112, 2044; José Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu 
Judgment, International Law Students’ Association Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 5 (1998-1999) 359-370, 359. 
43  A right protected, inter alia by Art. 14 (3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S., 171, 177. 
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controversial justification of punishment,44 it is one that has some pedigree 
in international criminal law, if not always its practice.45  
There is also the matter of the paradox that a person who kills one 
person is more likely to be prosecuted than one who has killed thousands,46 
which threatens to undermine some of the other aims of international 
criminal justice. The fact that prosecutions (frequently in democracies, it 
must be said) of low ranking officials rather than the devisers of policies 
that lead to international crimes, have led to critiques of the legitimacy of 
such prosecutions which, whilst they do not undermine the legality of such 
trials, do have some effect on their legitimacy.47 Hence, although there are 
questions about precisely how well prosecutions can fulfil all the aims they 
are said to have,48 there is much to be said for those aims, and as such, it is 
at least as important to prosecute leaders as it is to prosecute others, in spite 
of the difficulties that attend such prosecutions.  
International criminal law, as can be seen, has to take account of the 
countervailing imperatives that show the necessity of prosecuting those at 
all levels of responsibility, whilst also encouraging the prosecution of those 
at the apex of responsibility. The modern International (and 
internationalised) Criminal Tribunals have dealt with the matter sensibly, 
noting the imperative of prosecuting those at the highest level possible, 
whilst ensuring that this does not become a legal requirement that would 
imply that those who are not at that level do not bear any responsibility. 
That said, let us move on to the specific difficulties that attend the 
 
44  It is even more controversial when the person has not been proved to have committed 
any such crime, such as those in Guantánamo Bay, see e.g. Diane Marie Amann, 
Guantánamo, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2003) 263-348, 263. 
45  For an early assertion of this view at the Tokyo IMT see the Separate Opinion of the 
Member from the Netherlands, reprinted in Neil Boister & Robert Cryer (eds), supra 
note 16, 701  
46  The paradox is referred to, with regard to the gallows humour that it has engendered in 
conflict situations, in Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Search for 
Global Justice, 3rd ed. (2006), 372. 
47  For a forceful discussion of the responsibility of high-ranking members of the Bush 
administration, and a critique of the limitation of prosecutions to low ranking 
perpetrators, see e.g. Jordan J. Paust, Beyond The Law: The Bush Administration’s 
Unlawful Responses to the War on Terror (2007). This type of critique is one with 
considerable historical pedigree. For one classic of the genre see Telford Taylor, 
Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970). 
48  See generally Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson & Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2007), 
Chapter 2.  
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prosecutions of those at the highest level, and begin with the specific 
criminal law problems that have to be dealt with when international criminal 
law engages with such persons. 
C. Bringing Leaders to Justice: The Legal Problems 
There are a number of legal difficulties with prosecuting leaders; some 
relate to the criminal law aspects of international criminal law, in particular 
the principles of liability that are used to link leaders to the physical 
perpetration of crimes. Others can be found in more general aspects of 
international law, such as the difficulties of ensuring co-operation in an 
international legal system that is not especially conducive to ensuring such 
co-operation, and the immunities that attach to high-level government 
officials. Let us begin with the former. 
I. Principles of Liability 
Criminal law is, understandably, focussed primarily on the physical 
perpetrator of offences, such as the person who pulls the trigger, otherwise 
administers the fatal blow, or sells drugs to users. However, as William 
Schabas has noted, international criminal law tends to have a greater focus 
on those who are not direct perpetrators in this manner, but those who lead, 
order or permit offences from on high.49 However, this is by no means a 
simple matter: for the most part, leaders are far away from the actual 
offences, and pursuant to policies of plausible deniability tend not to write 
their orders down, but let others know their wishes in less permanent 
manners. Nazi Germany and (at times) Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime 
were exceptions in this regard. Most leaders do not seek to sully themselves 
with either direct perpetration of crimes, or evidence of their ordering of 
such offences. For similar reasons, they also are often careful not to provide 
clear evidence of their acquiescence in them (or ensure that any such 
 
49  William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Prosecuting the 
Accomplices, International Review of the Red Cross 842 (2001), 439-458, 440. 
Although in certain civil law systems, the Hintermann idea is used to consider the 
director of offences committed by others to be perpetrators: Claus Kreß, Claus 
Roxin’s Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft und das Völkerstrafrecht, in: 
Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (2006) 304. The recent development of co-
perpetration in the ICC appears to reflect something of this, see: e.g. Thomas 
Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges, Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008), 471-487. 
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evidence is destroyed before it can be brought to the attention of 
international prosecutors).50 High level international criminals are rarely 
stupid, naïve or unintelligent: demagogues without intellect do not 
frequently last long enough for liability to attach to them, those that last 
longer are usually perfectly aware of the mechanisms by which they may 
plausibly deny international crimes.  
Therefore for the vast majority of cases against high level 
perpetrators, as the Prosecution found in the Milošević case, a considerable 
evidential hurdle has to be overcome to link those in lofty positions to the 
offences committed on the ground. This issue was precisely what split the 
Majority and Judge Pal (and, on occasion, Judge Röling) at the Tokyo 
IMT.51 As a result of this difficulty, two doctrines have been developed that 
seek, in addition to reflecting the way in which collective action crimes, 
which many if not most international crimes are, tend to be committed: 
Command (Superior) Responsibility and Joint Criminal Enterprise.52 
Neither is uncontroversial. 
II. Command Responsibility 
Command responsibility is the liability that attaches to those in a 
position to prevent or punish international crimes committed by their 
subordinates. It applies to both civilian and military superiors.53 It is 
reasonably well explained for present purposes by Article 7(3) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute. 
 
50  This includes witness evidence, as the killing of possible witnesses, including 
perpetrator-witnesses has not proved uncommon.  
51  See Neil Boister & Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A 
Reappraisal, (2008) Chapters 7-8. 
52  The literature on both is huge, for a sample see: Albin Eser, Individual Criminal 
Responsibility, in: Antonio Cassese et al. (eds), Commentary on The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (2002), 767; Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: 
Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity (The Banality of Good), Columbia Law 
Review, 105 (2005), 1751-1862; Elies van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003); Wiliam. H. 
Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, Military Law Review 62 (1973), 1-
104; Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, American 
Journal of Comparative Law 49 (2001), 455-496. 
53  See: Tokyo IMT Judgment, 48, 442-7; US v. Karl Brandt et al. (The Doctors’ Trial) 
IV LRTWC 91-3. Keep the two originals, but add The Prosecutor v. Ignace 
Bagilishema (Appeal Judgement: Reasons), ICTR-95-1A-A, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 3 July 2002, para.52 
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The fact that [crimes were] committed by a subordinate does not 
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such 
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.54 
 
This article has three major aspects, first, a superior/subordinate 
relationship; second, the “mental element”; and third, a failure to take 
reasonable measures to prevent or punish violations of international criminal 
law.55 Importantly, it is an offence that can be proved by proof, not of giving 
orders, but by an omission, and does not even require proof that the leader 
knew of the offences, merely that he had reason to know or should have 
known of them. Notably, however, for civilians, the Rome Statute provides 
that the leader must have known, or “consciously disregarded information 
that clearly indicated” that crimes were being committed or about to be.56 
This raising of the mens rea requirement is unfortunate for cases against 
high-level government officials, leaving a loophole that they (alongside 
their usually expensive lawyers) are almost certain to seek to exploit. 
The principle is an important one, but as, mentioned above, it is not 
without controversy. In its initial formulation, in the Yamashita case, one of 
its justifications was brought into the open, the court found that he either 
must have tolerated them, or secretly ordered them.57 Some criticise this, on 
the basis that failures in evidence should not lead the development of new 
inculpatory doctrines.58 This is true, but it must be remembered that the 
 
54  Article 7(3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Statute, Art. 6(3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statute 
and Art. 6(3) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Statute are essentially the 
same. Article 28 of the Rome Statute is slightly different, especially on the mental 
element required for civilian superiors and causation. The difference need not detain 
us here, however. 
55  Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo (Čelebići Camp), ICTY Judgment of the Court, IT-
96-22-A, 11 November 1998, paras 344, 346; Gerhard Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (2005), 136-137. 
56  Rome Statute, Article 28. This is not the customary position, see Bagilishema (Appeal 
Judgement, para.52. 
57  Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 
(LRTWC) IV (1945), 34. 
58  Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in: Antonio Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 823. 
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doctrine is linked strongly to the duty of a superior to prevent international 
crimes over which he has control. A failure in this regard can be 
appropriately criminalised.59  
Nonetheless, as it stands, command responsibility is problematic, 
perhaps because it covers too many different forms of liability. It moves 
from knowing failures to intervene despite a duty, which is close to 
traditional complicity ideas, to, in essence, negligent dereliction of duty.60 
They are, simply speaking, very different things, a fact recognised by the 
German law relating to the subject, which deals separately with failure to 
know of offences in dereliction of duty, failure to report an offence, and 
knowing tolerance of offences when there is a duty and ability to intervene 
to prevent it. By treating all forms of command responsibility the same, the 
ICTY61 and the Rome Statute unfortunately distort the various concepts in a 
manner which “display[s] a measure of insensitivity to the degree of the 
actor’s own personal culpability”.62  
III. Joint Criminal Enterprise63  
Despite the prominence Command Responsibility is thought to have 
in leadership trials, the more frequent approach by the ICTY prosecutor, 
including in the Milošević case, is Joint Criminal Enterprise. This is a 
doctrine which was derived, not without controversy, from a few post-war 
 
59  See Robert Cryer, General Principles of Liability in International Criminal Law, in: 
Dominic McGoldrick et al. (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal 
ad Policy Issues (2004). 
60  For an extremely useful discussion of this matter, see: Damaška, supra, note 52, 460-
471. 
61  The ICTY has recently recast command responsibility in a different light, not as 
responsibility for the underlying crimes, but as a sui generis form of liability for the 
omission itself (This began in Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility, IT-01-54-AR72, 16 July 2003, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, para.78; and (seemingly) achieved majority acceptance in: Prosecutor 
v. Hadzihasanovic and Kubura (Appeal Judgment). IT-01-47-A. International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 22 April 2008, para.39; but this 
is not how the principle has traditionally been seen, nor has it been so seen by the 
Rome Statute. See e.g. Christopher Greenwood, Command Responsibility and the 
Hadžihasanović Decision, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 598-605. 
62  See, supra, note 52, Damaška, 456. 
63  This sub-section builds upon the relevant section of Chapter 15 of Cryer, Friman, 
Robinson & Wilmshurst, see supra, note 48, 304-307. 
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cases in the Tadić decision. It is a principle of liability which lies 
somewhere between conspiracy and aiding and abetting and covers three 
situations: “co-perpetration,64 where all participants in the common design 
possess the same criminal intent to commit a crime (and one or more of 
them actually perpetrate the crime, with intent).[…] so-called 
“concentration camp” cases,” and “type three” joint criminal enterprise, 
where crimes are committed by members of the group, outside its common 
purpose, but as a foreseeable incident of it.65 It determined that all three 
types shared a common actus reus, namely that there was: 
 
i. A plurality of persons. 
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which 
amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for 
in the Statute. 
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving 
the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the 
Statute.66 
 
The mental element is probably where the controversy really comes 
in, it extends to  
 
the intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or 
the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint 
criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime 
by the group. In addition, responsibility for a crime other than 
the one agreed upon in the common plan arises only if, under the 
circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a 
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the 
group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.67 
 
 
64  Co-perpetration, as a separate principle of liability has recently become prominent in 
the ICC, supra, note 49. 
65  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, para.220; See also: 
Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgement), ICTR-2001-64-
A, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 7 July 2006, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen, para.40. 
66  Id., para.227. 
67  Id., para.228. 
 Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Practicalities 61 
From the point of view of fairness to the defendant, the vague, 
“elastic” nature of the doctrine has led to claims that it is overbroad, thus 
reliant on prosecutorial discretion rather than law to keep it in check.68 Fears 
have also been expressed about the extent to which it encourages 
prosecutors to bring indictments that assert joint enterprises in a very 
general manner, making preparation difficult for the defence.69 Turning to 
the mens rea, a person can be convicted of specific intent crimes such as 
genocide even if that person did not have the relevant mens rea for that 
offence, but the crimes were a natural and foreseen incident of the enterprise 
he or she was involved in on the basis of joint criminal enterprise.70 This has 
led to criticisms of joint criminal enterprise liability, as it allows the 
prosecution to circumvent the proper mens rea requirements for such 
serious crimes,71 especially as the ICTY considers Joint Criminal Enterprise 
as a form of perpetration rather than a separate principle of liability.72 The 
principle does go some way to describing the joint nature of many 
international crimes and explaining the culpability of some participants not 
otherwise easily brought under the ambit of criminality, in spite of their 
blameworthiness.73 
As can be seen, though, both of these ways which have been used in 
an attempt to circumvent the evidential problems that arise when 
prosecuting leaders and reflect the way in which they participate in 
international crimes. Despite their positive aspects, we also have to accept 
that they are not always used or interpreted with sufficient care with respect 
to the principle of individual culpability. This is only one example of Mark 
Osiel’s point that it is difficult to prosecute high-level offenders within a 
liberal framework74 (although the difficulty is no reason not to prosecute, or 
to abandon a liberal framework for prosecution). 
 
68  Osiel, The Banality of Good, supra, note 52, 1799-1802. 
69  Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad Hoc Tribunals (2005), 293. 
70  Prosecutor v Brđanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, IT-99-36-A, 19 March 2004, 
para. 6. 
71  Mettraux, supra, note 69, 265; Osiel, The Banality of Good, supra, note 52, 1796. 
72  Prosecutor v. Odjanić et al, Decision on Motion on Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, IT-99-37-AR72, 21 May 2005, para. 20. 
73  Mettraux, supra, note 70, 292; Osiel, The Banality of Good, supra, note 52, 1786-
1790, but see 1802. 
74  Mark Osiel, Why Prosecute, Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, Human Rights 
Quarterly 22 (2000), 118, 123-125. See also: Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of 
International Criminal Law, Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008), 925-963, 
926. 
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D. Co-operation 
I. Persuading the Perpetrators to Help 
This leads to a large problem, that of obtaining both evidence and 
defendants.75 Everything that has been said so far implies that the person 
concerned is actually already before the court and that there is (admissible) 
evidence against them. As is well-known, this is not always the case. The 
ICTY and ICTR both have strong powers to order compliance, whilst the 
ICC has somewhat weaker powers here.76 Irrespective of the powers they 
have in theory, though, it is difficult to obtain people or evidence without 
some state co-operation, or a resort to irregular rendition (as occurred in a 
number of cases before the ICTY such as Dokmanović).77 In this area, a 
sympathetic locus delicti, as Rwanda has, usually78 proved in relation to 
Hutu defendants, means that co-operation is infinitely more likely to be 
forthcoming than in situations where it does not feel that it is in its interest 
to comply.79 
When a sitting head of State or high ranking government official (or 
someone with information about them) is being sought, the State is 
essentially certain to decide it is not, and to weather the costs. It is only after 
Milošević was deposed in the wake of local protests that he was handed 
over to the ICTY, and then only after a large IMF loan was mothballed until 
he was handed over. Similarly, it is unthinkable to Rwanda to co-operate 
with any investigations into the possible liability of high-ranking members 
of the new government, and it has even been alleged that attempting to 
initiate such investigations cost Carla del Ponte her job as Prosecutor of the 
ICTR.80 Where the locus delicti is unwilling, co-operation coming from 
 
75  See generally: Peskin’s excellent study, supra, note 3, passim. 
76  As can be seen, for example, by comparison of Articles 29 ICTY Statute (28 ICTR 
Statute) and Articles 86, 89 and 91 Rome Statute. See also: René Blattmann & Kirsten 
Bowen, Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal Court, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 6 (2008), 711-730, 722-723. 
77  Prosecutor v. Mrkšić Kvočka, Radić, Žigić and Prcać, Decision on the Motion for 
Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović, IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997. 
78  For an instance to the contrary see: William A. Schabas, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 
American Journal of International Law 94 (2000), 563-571. 
79  See generally: Rod Rastan, Testing Co-Operation: The International Criminal Court 
and National Authorities, Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008), 431-456. 
80  Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005), 977-988, 978-979. 
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third States relies on the happenstance of the person or evidence being 
found in that State and the State being willing to co-operate with the 
relevant tribunal or requesting State. Sometimes, as in the Pinochet 
litigation,81 this is the case, at other times, such as with respect to Charles 
Taylor during his Nigerian exile, prior to the Liberian request that he be 
handed over to the Special Court, it is not. 
The politics of co-operation are exceptionally important, and require 
the Prosecution to tread a fine line of ensuring that States remain friendly 
enough to the Court to co-operate, whilst safeguarding (real and perceived) 
prosecutorial independence and ensuring that crimes by all sides may be 
prosecuted.82 It is interesting that in this regard, the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court has had very little luck obtaining any co-
operation at all from Sudan in relation to the possibility of prosecuting high-
level government officials, to the extent to which this fed in to his recent, 
and controversial, request for the an arrest warrant for the President Omar 
al-Bashir.83 
II. Immunities84 
This request itself brings us to the vexed question of immunities. Al-
Bashir is a sitting head of State (as was Charles Taylor at the time of his 
indictment), and in relation to high level governmental officials (precisely 
 
81  Regina v. Bow, Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening) All England Law 
Reports 2 1999, 97. Rosanne van Alebeek, The Pinochet Case: International Human 
Rights Law on Trial, British Yearbook of International Law 71 (2000), 29-70, 69. 
82  See: Peskin, supra, note 3; Steven Roper & Lillian Barria, State Co-operation and the 
International Criminal Court: Bargaining Influence in the Arrest and Surrender of 
Suspects, Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008), 457-476, 457; William 
Burke-White, Bargaining for Arrests at the International Criminal Court: A Response 
to Roper and Barria, Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008), 477-482, 477. 
83  See: e.g., Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) 5 December 2007 paras 3, 6; 
Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58 Filed on 14 
June 2008, ICC02/05, 12 September 2008, especially paras 411-2. For a very useful 
explanation of the context of this action see: Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court and 
Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in: Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark 
(eds), Courting Conflict: Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008), 29. 
84  For a recent detailed study see: Roseanne van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and 
Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law 
(2008). 
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which ones remains a matter of debate),85 as the ICJ reaffirmed in the 
Yerodia case,86 they retain their personal immunity before courts (especially 
national courts) even when there are allegations of international crimes. 
There is an exception to this, such persons do not retain their immunity 
before “certain international tribunals”. The ICTY and ICTR are clearly 
covered by this, as, according to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, is the ICC. 
This exception was controversially interpreted by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in the Taylor case to include that Court, even though its basis 
was a treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone, to which Liberia was not a 
party.87 
Normally, though the personal immunity of high level governmental 
officials extends, absent any special applicable provision to the contrary, to 
arrest and detention for the purpose of arrest or transfer to international 
tribunals. The ICTY and ICTR are exceptions to this, but this can be put 
down to the fact that their Statutes were passed by Security Council 
Resolutions (827 and 955 respectively), under Chapter VII, and which, by 
virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, trumps those immunities. For 
parties to the Rome Statute, it is broadly accepted that parties have waived 
their immunity before foreign courts for the purposes of co-operation with 
the Court. For non-State parties, however, Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute 
requires State parties not to violate the immunities accepted in international 
law.88 All of which renders obtaining co-operation in the surrender of high-
ranking officials even harder, although it ought not be forgotten that there 
are good reasons for personal immunities.89 
It is, of course, the case that ex-leaders (and, of course, rebels or other 
erstwhile allies who have fallen from favour), do not have immunity, either 
before domestic courts or international tribunals. This is perhaps the closest 
 
85  See, e.g. Colin Warbrick, Current Developments, Public International Law, Immunity 
and International Crimes in English Law, Comment on Mofaz, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (2004), 771-774. 
86  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), I.C.J. 
Reports 2002, 3-35. 
87  Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, SCSL-2003-01-I-A, 31 
May 2004, paras 43-59. 
88  See further: Cryer, Friman, Robinson & Wilmshurst, supra, note 48, Chapter 20. 
89  For (good) arguments to the effect that Al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials would 
not be covered by this see: Dapo Akande, The Bashir Indictment: Are Heads of State 
Immune From ICC Prosecution?, Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working 
Paper, available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Akande.pdf (last visited 8 
December 2008). 
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that international criminal law can come to balance impunity and stability 
(on which more later), but, it has its own problems. First, it gives those in 
power a reason to cling on to it. Second, and related to this, as the Milošević 
case showed at the international level, and at least arguably the Pinochet 
precedent evidenced domestically,90 the longer a person can avoid arrest, the 
less likely they are to be fit enough to face the type of justice that does not 
rely on the existence of a perfect metaphysical realm.91 As Hilaire 
McCoubrey made clear, old age is no legal or moral defence to international 
crimes,92 but procedurally, it is a more difficult to ensure trials for a 
defendant who has been immune for a many years. After all, here we are 
talking of leaders who may have been in power for more than twenty years, 
and may not have been in the first flush of youth in when they ascended to 
high office. In addition, time can fade witnesses’ memories. 
Finally, there is another problem. This relates to the fact that it is, for a 
variety of reasons, easier for a prosecutor, given the relevant rules on 
immunity (when added to the difficulties related to obtaining State co-
operation) to proceed against those who do not have such immunity or 
political bars related to prosecution. This is understandable, since co-
operation in relation to such suspects at least ought to be easier to obtain. 
This, in the short term, may seem like a good idea. Those who are not 
covered by immunity or political patronage might be thought to be a more 
ready sense of defendants, and thus work, for any court or tribunal seeking 
to establish its own legitimacy (and justify its continued existence (and 
budget)). Still, this runs the risk of appearing to be taking sides in conflicts, 
in particular, on the government side, a criticism that has been made of the 
ICC Prosecutor already.93 
 
90  There are those who were unconvinced that Pinochet was really unfit to stand trial, but 
this must remain a matter of conjecture.  
91  As Sluiter notes, the fact that Radovan Karadžić has claimed he is in good health gives 
grounds for “modest optimism”. Göran Sluiter, Karadžić on Trial: Two Procedural 
Problems, Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008), 617-626, 618. 
92  Hilaire McCoubrey, The Concept and Treatment of War Crimes, Journal of Armed 
Conflict Law 1 (1996), 121-139, 133. 
93  William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism and the 
International Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008) 731-
761, 751-753. 
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E. Peace v Justice: The Old, Hard, Chestnut 
Such considerations lead us to a, perhaps the, central problem that has 
plagued the ICC with respect to its early situations. This is the well-known, 
and frequently referred to Peace v Justice “paradox”. When it comes to the 
law, some, such as Geoffrey Robertson, the ex-president of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, have gone as far as to say that international law has 
developed to the level that although at times amnesties for lower level 
offences may be granted, there is a current norm prohibiting any amnesty 
for those at the top level.94 This may (in relation to crimes not covered by 
treaty based obligations to prosecute) be lex ferenda rather than lex lata.95 
The accurate position was restated by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the Kallon and Kamara decision, “that there is a crystallising international 
norm that a government cannot grant amnesty for serious violations of 
crimes under international law is amply supported by materials placed 
before the Court [but the view] that it has crystallised may not be entirely 
correct [...] it is accepted that such a norm is developing under international 
law”.96 In any event, as Louise Mallinder has noted, “amnesties for both 
international and non-international crimes continue to be a political reality 
in the modern world”.97 
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that this is not the place in 
which the problems of peace and justice are going to be given a solution, but 
there are a few relevant points that ought to be borne in mind. The first of 
these is that those most likely to be in a position to demand amnesty as a 
price for laying down their arms (or leaving power), are leaders, and that at 
times amnesties for such people are taken seriously. It cannot be ignored 
that just prior to the Iraq war, Saddam Hussein was offered some form of 
 
94  Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process, Amnesty 
Provided by Lomé Accord, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), 25 May 2004, Separate Opinion 
of Justice Robertson, paras 32-34. 
95  Although for modern arguments that amnesties are now prohibited in international 
law, see Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in 
Transitional Justice Schemes, Virginia Journal of International Law 49 (forthcoming 
2009). 
96  Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé 
Accord Amnesty, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL 2004-16-AR72(E) 13 March 
2004, para.82. 
97  Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the 
Peace and Justice Divide, 1st ed. (2008), 404. 
 Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Practicalities 67 
amnesty,98 and the issue has risen again very strongly in relation to the 
possible arrest warrant that is pending before a Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
ICC for the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. This latter process has led 
to considerable international comment. Entirely unsurprisingly, it led to 
howls of protest from Sudan,99 raising arguments about neo-imperialism,100 
but also with none-too veiled threats to the peace process. Sudan argued that 
the peace in the North-South conflict, as well as peace in Darfur rested on a 
knife edge, and that any such indictment would undermine those peace 
processes. As a result, there have been suggestions that the Prosecutor has 
over-reached himself, and that the Security Council ought to, at least, defer 
any further action in relation to al-Bashir. 
Most notably, following the Prosecutor’s issue of the request to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber the African Union issued a communiqué in which they 
requested the Security Council to issue a request under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute for proceedings with respect to al-Bashir to be deferred.101 
This request was noted by the Security Council in Resolution When these 
calls first came, the Security Council responded, in Resolution 1828 (31 
July 2008), with language that was by no means clear: 
 
Taking note of the African Union (AU) communiqué of the 
142nd Peace and Security Council […] [which asked the Security 
Council issue a deferral request compliant with Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute] […] having in mind concerns raised by members 
of the Council regarding potential developments subsequent to 
the application of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court of 14 July 2008, and taking note of their intention to 
consider these matters further […].102 
 
 
98  Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 
Washington and Lee Law Review 63 (2006) 339-378, 340. 
99  See Simon Tisdall, Man blamed for Darfur crisis says “I am in peace with myself”, 
The Guardian (4 December 2008) 28-29. 
100  This is not to say that such arguments are justified, but they are not without resonance 
for many. 
101  Art. 16 Rome Statute reads: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.” 
102  SC Res. 1828, 5947th mtg., SC UN Doc. S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008), 2. 
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Sudan seemed pleased with this outcome, its representative at the 
Security Council asserting that: 
 
The Security Council should provide […] cooperation; give 
highest priority to the peace process; and allay all threats to the 
process, such as the measure undertaken by the Chief Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) […]. The African 
Union is not a foreign element; in fact, it is an inherent partner 
in all matters related to Darfur. In commending the role of the 
African Union, the principal partner in all issues concerning 
peace and stability of Darfur, we also commend the very 
important adoption by the African Union, at the emergency 
ministerial meeting of its Peace and Security Council at Addis 
Ababa, of a resolution that seeks to rise above the impediments 
and complexities created by the unfortunate and tragic action 
taken by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC against one of the 
greatest leaders of the African continent, who has put an end to 
the longest-running conflict there and brought about peace 
between the South and the North of the Sudan. […] We should 
move beyond the measure taken by the Chief Prosecutor, which 
is a recipe for destruction and ruin and poses a catastrophic 
danger to the stability, security and unity of the Sudan, the 
region as a whole and even the entire African continent.103 
 
The language, vague though it was, led the US, rarely the ICC’s 
greatest supporter, to abstain from the vote on this resolution and to express 
its displeasure at the possibility of the Council deferring any proceedings by 
virtue of Article 16 of the ICC Statute, as it “would send the wrong signal to 
Sudanese President Al-Bashir and undermine efforts to bring him and others 
to justice”.104 It is true that the African Union is the UN’s partner on the 
 
103  Meeting Record, 5947th mtg., SC UN Doc. S/PV.5947 (31 July 2008), 12. 
104  Id., 12; See also the statement by Belgium, Id.¸10, that: “The Sudan’s obligations and 
responsibilities in Darfur are clear. They have been set out in all previous resolutions, 
as well as in this one. Belgium will continue to work in the Security Council to ensure 
respect by the Sudan for all Council resolutions. We owe it to the population of 
Darfur, but we also owe it to the cause of international justice”. This statement is itself 
an interesting example of what Frédéric Mégret has described as the emancipation of 
international criminal justice from narrow focuses on peace and security, see Frédéric 
Mégret, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The Security Council and the 
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ground in Darfur, and its views are worthy of respect. However, this does 
not mean that al-Bashir is in fact the force for peace he claims to be.105 The 
Darfur conflict has been ongoing for over five years now, and al-Bashir has 
a vested interest (as do most leaders) in placing themselves in the role of the 
necessary part of the peace process.106 As was said in a slightly different 
context, 
 
Washington’s efforts to downplay Milošević’s culpability in war 
crimes in order to make him a palatable partner matched 
Milošević’s own efforts. The Serbian leader was often careful to 
keep diplomatic channels open and appear committed to reach a 
negotiated solution. Milošević had an uncanny ability, Power 
notes, of cultivating the impression from the very start that of 
the conflict that “peace was right around the corner”. 
Milošević’s personal charm, fluent English, and ability to 
present a moderate image helped drive Western diplomats’ 
wishful thinking about his true intentions.107 
 
There is more than a little to this, indeed, in some instances it may 
even be the case that some level of continued instability is quite conducive 
to their continuation in power. When questions of peace and justice are 
spoken of, the interests of the actors in portraying themselves as the 
peacemakers (whether they can or are taking on that role) must not be 
forgotten. 
In this regard it ought to be also noted that interests can be more than 
simply political. Many leaders responsible for crimes (or their supporters) 
may also have personal interests in protecting themselves and their friends 
from investigation and prosecution. As was well explained by Steven Ratner 
in relation to the politics of the Cambodian situation: 
 
Hun Sen wished to protect certain members of his government 
who had once been leading Khmer Rouge offenders who might 
 
Emancipation of International Criminal Justice, Leiden Journal of International Law 
21 (2008) 485-512, 485. 
105  BBC News, Sudan Declares Darfur Ceasefire (12 November 2008), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7724220.stm (last visited 8 December 2008). 
106  Multi NGO report, Rhetoric v. Reality: The Situation in Darfur (December 2008) 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/darfur1208.pdf 
(last visited 8 December 2008). 
107  See: supra, note 3, Peskin, 37. 
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well face trial. Second, Hun Sen had made certain deals with ex-
Khmer Rouge leaders, including senior 1970s-regime leaders 
Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Noun Chea, granting them de 
facto (and, in Ieng Sary’s case, de jure) amnesty in exchange for 
their political support. He did not wish to renege on these deals 
and argued that they were necessary to prevent a return to civil 
war. In fact, we found no evidence of any support for these ex-
Khmer Rouge leaders from their former cadres and no danger 
that they could mobilise actions against the government. The 
deals may well have been financial in nature, involving mutual 
respect of the spheres of influence of Hun Sen and the ex-Khmer 
Rouge, as each seeks to engage in off-the-books illegal mining 
and timber gathering.108 
 
Finally, given that indictments can also serve to affect the relative 
position of parties, it may simply be that predictions about the impact of 
indictments on peace are very difficult.109 As such, it is an area in which 
even realists (or those who consider themselves such) need to tread 
carefully, and evaluate all the evidence more carefully than simply 
accepting at face value the participants’ assertions.110 This is not to say 
some people are not, or cannot be peacemakers, but their statements are to 
be treated with caution. After all, the Dayton talks worked without 
Karadžić. 
 
108  Steven Ratner, Chair of the United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, in: 
Timothy L. H. McCormack & Cheryl Saunders (eds), Sir Ninian Stephen: A Tribute 
(2007) 206-219, 211. 
109  See the exchange of views on point in: Stephen Oola, Bashir and the ICC: The Aura 
or Audition of International Justice in Africa? (15 October 2008), Oxford Transitional 
Justice Research Working Paper available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ 
OolaFin.pdf (last visited 8 December 2008) (Bashir and the ICC); Lutz Oette, Another 
Piece in the Puzzle: Accountability and Justice for International Crimes in Sudan (20 
August 2008), Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper available at 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/OetteFi.pdf (last visited 8 December 2008); 
Yvonne Malan, The Force of Law and the Problem of Impunity (28 July 2008), 
Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper available at 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Malan.pdf (last visited 8 December 2008); Phil 
Clark, If Ocampo Indicts Bashir, Nothing May Happen (13 July 2008), Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Working Paper, available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/ 
documents/Clark_Final.pdf (last visited 8 December 2008). 
110  See in particular: Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, Ethics and International 
Affairs 13 (1999) 81-98, 83-84. 
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The prosecutor, who has been criticised for playing politics at times, 
has recently been taking great pains to say that amnesties and the like, are 
not really part of his remit, opining (with respect to choice of situations): 
 
The Statute provides a clear framework to select situations and 
cases to investigate. […] I have to apply the law. Nothing more, 
nothing less. The decision that ending impunity will endure 
lasting peace and security was taken in Rome. I should not, and 
I will not take into account political considerations.111 
 
Of course, politics can enter into the equation under the Rome Statute 
in two ways, the most direct way being by virtue of Article 16.112 This, of 
course, provides for the Security Council to cause the Court to defer 
investigations or proceedings for a (renewable) one year period. The factors 
that may militate in favour of amnesty however, are for the Security Council 
to appraise, and only if there is sufficient agreement in the Council for a 
resolution requesting deferral. This in itself is quite a high threshold. What 
is perhaps most interesting about Article 16 is that it means that the process 
can only be deferred (and only for as long as the Security Council continues 
to issue yearly resolutions). Accountability cannot be bargained away in a 
quiet, or permanent, manner if the ICC has jurisdiction and the Prosecutor 
becomes involved. This, in itself, is a shift in international relations. 
It is true that the Prosecutor, when exercising his discretion under 
Article 53 of the Statute, may take into account the concept of the “interests 
of justice”, which gives some elbow room for him to decline to become 
involved in certain circumstances. This could include a situation in which an 
amnesty is being negotiated or has been granted.113 However, as he has 
made clear, and was noted above, where here is a basis to believe that 
 
111  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Address to the Assembly of States Parties, 14 November 2008, 
2-11, 6. This provides an interesting return to the initial position adopted in the OTP, 
see: Benjamin J. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (2008) 111-115. 
112  See generally: Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejić, Article 16, in: Otto Triffterer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. 
(2008). 
113  Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999) 507-528, 507-508; 
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and 
the International Criminal Court, European Journal of International Law 14 (2003) 
481-505, 483-488. 
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crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed, prosecution 
is meant to be the default option. The Prosecutor has taken the view, 
understandably, given the upshot of the Rome Statute, that it is only in truly 
exceptional situations that the interests of justice ought to lead him not to 
pursue prosecutions. Furthermore, as has been said by the Prosecutor, the 
interests of justice are not necessarily the same as the interests of peace.114 
Although this does undermine in a small way his assertion that the role of 
the Prosecutor is an entirely apolitical one, in itself, the idea that the default 
position is prosecution is a positive step. On top of this, if a State or the 
Security Council referred the matter to the Prosecutor, then a decision not to 
proceed with an investigation, any decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed 
is subject to review by a pre-Trial Chamber.115 The fact that such discretion 
is subject to judicial review is, again, important, insofar as it ensures that 
any decision on point is transparent.116 
F. The Practical Problems 
I. Prosecution Strategy 
Even if a leader finds their way to the dock, there is another practical 
issue, which has recently arisen with respect to the trials of Slobodan 
Milošević and Saddam Hussein. This is the ambit of the indictment. Should 
the prosecutor move to indict a person, as the OTP of the ICTY did with 
charges that span the entire set of crimes for which they are thought to bear 
responsibility, or proceed, as the Prosecution in the Saddam Hussein 
proceedings did, and attempt to focus on one or more easy cases? 
Both strategies have their advantages. The idea of the large 
indictment, which of course was the approach taken by the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo International Military Tribunals. These have the advantage, if it is 
one, of being able to provide a large narrative of the conflict(s-) as a whole, 
and one of the asserted benefits of criminal trials is that they help combat 
denial (and some go further to say promote reconciliation) by subjecting the 
facts to forensic scrutiny.117 They also, where the charges are adequately 
 
114  International Criminal Court - Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests 
of Justice (September 2007) 1-9, 1. 
115  Art. 53(3) Rome Statute. 
116  It must be admitted thought that not all of the early ICC practice is defensible on 
point. 
117  E.g.: Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law, 1st ed. (1997). 
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proved, provide, so far as is possible, for retribution at the appropriate level 
to the offences committed. This is linked to the idea that all the person’s 
victims will be given some satisfaction and have their suffering recognised. 
It also has the advantage of treating all the charges together, and in instances 
of crimes against humanity and, to some extent, genocide, where the 
contextual elements are of the essence in proving the charges, litigating 
broader aspects of the conflicts can be important. 
Nonetheless, there are pitfalls to this, it can lead to long, unwieldy 
trials, and give large leeway to the defence for dilatory tactics, either to 
delay proceedings excessively, or in the hope that the Tribunal will react in 
a manner that can be turned to their advantage and such that they can claim 
violations (sometimes justified) of breaches of fair trial rights.118 In 
addition, since leaders are often advancing in years by the time they reach 
trial there is always the risk of their death during the trial, which leaves a 
taste of futility in the mouths of many. It also encourages prosecutors to 
issue indictments which mix charges which are not as supported as others, 
and each acquittal serves to undermine part of the narrative that the 
prosecution was seeking to set up.119 As noted above, there are inculpatory 
doctrines specific to international crimes which deal in some way with 
evidential problems, but they are risky, if they are expanded too broadly, 
they ignore culpability, and will be subjected to critique. 
The virtues of the smaller charge, with the possibility of further 
charges later, approach are largely the converse of the critiques of the larger 
trial, they are comparatively simple, quick, and easy to run. The prosecutor 
in this instance is likely to investigate a number of different incidents, and 
begin with the case which is the strongest. This is what happened in the 
Dujail trial. Still, they are not free from problems, the first being it can only 
partially reflect what the person is suspected of doing, and cases like Dujail 
tend to be chosen not because they are especially representative, or 
comparatively serious, but because the prosecutor knows that he or she is 
going to be able to prove it. As a result, only a small part of the overall story 
 
118  See, generally: Göran Sluiter, Karadžić on Trial: Two Procedural Problems, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008) 617-626; Marko Milanović, The Arrest and 
Impending Trial of Radovan Karadžić, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
58 (forthcoming 2009); Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling 
Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 39 (2006-2007), 155-170; It cannot be 
forgotten that leaders are used to manipulating processes and posturing, and are often 
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119  On all the above aspects, see, for example, Boas supra note 3. 
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gets told, and many victims will not have their tales told. It is true that there 
may be the possibility of further trials, but, where, as with the Saddam trial, 
the person is sentenced to death, this is impossible. In this particular case 
this means that the Kurds and the Iranians, as well as the Kuwaitis and 
Coalition personnel who were mistreated in 1991 will never see Saddam 
stand trial for offences against them. Even where this reprehensible 
punishment is not imposed, further trials will probably take a long time, 
longer than even a large trial is likely to, as the process has to go through all 
the relevant stages again. 
Given the problems of both of these, it must be said, a prosecutor is 
offered a difficult choice, and is in some ways caught on the horns of an 
almost insoluble dilemma. Perhaps the best way forward is to try at least to 
deal with a manageable number of representative instances, where the 
evidence is strong. Fortunately, since the death penalty is unavailable in the 
International Criminal Court, the problem of killing the defendant before the 
possibility of further trials is, at least, excluded. 
G. Conclusion 
The above may sound rather negative. If so, it must be emphasised 
that it is not intended to be, similarly nor is it counsel in favour of not 
attempting to prosecute leaders. It is precisely the opposite. The swing 
towards justice is an exceptionally important legal (and moral) 
development, and just as something is difficult does not mean that it ought 
not to be pursued with vigour. It is worth, however, doing so with an 
awareness of the possible pitfalls that such prosecutions face. It is only by 
facing such problems that progress can be made. 
In a statement released just after the Rome Conference, Amnesty 
International averred that: 
 
[t]he true significance of the adoption of the statute may well lie, 
not in the actual institution itself in its early years, which will 
face enormous obstacles, but in the revolution in legal and moral 
attitudes towards the worst crimes in the world. No longer will 
these crimes be simply political events to be addressed by 
diplomacy at the international level, but crimes which all states 
have a duty to punish themselves, or, if they fail to fulfil this 
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duty, by the international community in accordance with the rule 
of law.120 
 
This statement sums up a great deal of the importance of the ICC and 
international criminal law in general. Recent practice, including the creation 
of the ICC reflects, and contributes greatly to, a significant cultural turn to 
accountability for those crimes which are universally condemned. Fifteen 
years ago, most of those accused of international crimes could sleep 
soundly, fairly sure that they would not be required to stand trial for their 
conduct. It is unlikely that Augusto Pinochet or Hissene Habré thought that 
international law would impinge upon their dotage. Both of them, to 
different extents, have been proved wrong, even if, on the basis of what had 
occurred since Nuremberg and Tokyo, their opinion had an empirical basis. 
If nothing else, we are now in the situation where ex-statespeople who have 
been complicit (or more) in international crimes may have to reassess their 
situation. 
The criticism of the ICC that it is causing leaders to fear prosecution, 
and thus cling on to power rather than possibly face a flight to the Hague121 
may, optimistically, be viewed as the growing pains of international justice, 
and that the next generation of leaders, rather than committing crimes then 
fearing prosecution, might think twice before committing international 
crimes, and prevention is better than cure. Some will, nonetheless, commit 
such crimes, the lure of the end justifying the means is a siren song that too 
often proves irresistible.122 But criminal law can never eradicate crime, and 
if fewer leaders succumb to this temptation, international criminal justice 
will have proved itself worthwhile. 
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Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A, 28 May 2008, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
George Gelaga King, paras 26-31 & 90-94. 
  
 
